1. THE IMPOTENCE OF THE GREAT POWERS | 1. THE IMPOTENCE OF THE GREAT POWERS | The Policy of Avoiding War |
Many vied to occupy the throne left vacant by Bocskai's death. Most of the self-appointed candidates manoeuvred behind the scenes, trying to win support without attracting public attention. The contest degenerated to the point that, on 22 January, 1607, the diet assembled in Kolozsvár felt compelled to pass an act instructing the governor to 'seek out' the gentlemen who were 'canvassing for party support' and put an end to their plotting; they should, instead, publicly declare their candidacy at the diet that would be convened to elect the prince.[1] Although the legislation referred to the 'secret activities' of several people, it was aimed at two particular candidates: Gabriel Bethlen and Bálint Homonnai.
Gábor Báthori, the son of István Báthori of Somlyó, who had fled the country in 1594, observed the developments in Transylvania from his gloomy castle at Ecsed, in Szatmár County. Orphaned at early age, he had been raised at the court of his distant relative, István Báthori of Ecsed.
When Bocskai passed away, Gábor Báthori promptly threw his hat into the ring. His letter, dispatched on 2 January, 1607, reached the Porte ahead of the official notification of the prince's death. Although he did not even know the name of the new grand vizier, Pasha Murad, he addressed the latter with effusive friendliness: 'Your Lordship, my lord who wishes me well, my surrogate father.' He went on request something that his real father could certainly not have accomplished: that Murad persuade the sultan to entrust him with the 'voivodeship' of Transylvania. He evoked the merits of his distant forefather, King Stephen Báthori, the latter's 'faultless {2-4.} and enduring loyalty' to the Porte, in support of his claim to the throne; that office, he added impudently, 'also belongs to me by blood.' Báthori assured the sultan, by way of the grand vizier, that he 'and his country would offer loyal service as long as I live.' The tone of his letter suggested that he relied fully on Constantinople: 'Have your man proclaim that Transylvania must obey me.'[2]
In fact, Gábor Báthori was also counting on public opinion, without, however, making a personal effort to court it. Instead of going to Transylvania to seek the throne, he delegated his confidant Gabriel Bethlen, a prominent member of Transylvania's pro-Turkish party; the two men had met in Bocskai's circle. Bethlen was to act as Báthori's agent. Four days after the enactment of the bill concerning 'secret plots,' Governor Rákóczi had Bethlen thrown in jail. This setback led Báthori to suspend his efforts, but only for a few months. Yet it is unlikely that he received any encouragement from the Porte. There is no evidence that Báthori received any reply from the grand vizier, Pasha Murad, whereas all Hungary was aware of the sultan's message to the other candidate, Bálint Homonnai.
'In keeping with my majestic spirit's decision,' wrote the sultan to Homonnai, 'I consider you worthy […] to fill King Stephen's place, from the day of his death, as King of Transylvania and Hungary.'[3] With this, Constantinople considered the case to be settled: the formal documents from the sultan were dispatched along with the princely insignia. Thus no one else could expect support from the Porte. Homonnai owed this favor to Bocskai, whose will had named him as the successor. The late prince had great esteem for the young lord, who came from one of the most distinguished families in royal Hungary and had been among the first to join the movement initiated by the hajdús. Although Bálint Homonnai never invoked the merits of his forefathers, such a claim would have been almost as strong as that of Gábor Báthori: his family was closely related to that of the Szapolyais, who had provided the last {2-5.} Hungarian king and the first Transylvanian prince. Nothing would be said about this connection. The trustees of the late prince's testament simply informed the Porte about its contents, and the Ottomans acknowledged Bocskai's wish that he be succeeded by Homonnai; there was no need for additional references.
In Transylvania, however, Homonnai's candidacy prompted widespread outrage. The nobility considered the free election of a prince to be one of their basic rights. Since Bocskai's testament infringed upon this right, they violently dismissed the very possibility that they might endorse the late prince's choice.
The opposition was organized by Zsigmond Rákóczi, whose appointment as governor dated back to the election of István Bocskai; he had administered Transylvania in the name of the absent prince. Rákóczi was no more Transylvanian than Gábor Báthori or Bálint Homonnai, both of whom had their estates in royal, Upper Hungary; yet, through his official activities, he had developed good relations with the principality's political elite. Although Rákóczi was not generally regarded as an outstanding statesman, he must have been, in his own way, a talented man. He was among the few who managed to fully exploit the opportunities present around 1600 in order to rise from the lesser nobility to the ranks of the aristocracy. Upon his appointment as governor, he moved to Transylvania with his wealthy wife and two young sons. There he sized up the situation with the same facility that had served him earlier in his career. His interest soon focused on the two neighbouring Romanian voivodeships and the crown estates. He was busily promoting foreign trade and assessing the state's financial resources when news came of Bocskai's death.
Almost as a matter of course, Zsigmond Rákóczi became a candidate for the succession. Initially, he could have entertained but he had little hope of winning significant support. The Porte backed Homonnai, and Gábor Báthori drew strength from his illustrious ancestry; Rákóczi had no such assets. Yet these apparent weaknesses {2-6.} made him the preferred candidate of Transylvania's nobility; since he did not enjoy external support, he would be their man. He also had the advantage of being on the spot, whereas the other pretenders had never lived in Transylvania and made their bid from the outside. Homonnai made preparations in Kassa for Bocskai's burial, and he planned to come to Transylvania with the funeral cortege. Báthori also accompanied the procession, then returned to Ecsed.
Meanwhile, Zsigmond Rákóczi mounted his campaign in Transylvania. Initially, there appeared to be little urgency about finding a successor to István Bocskai. When the diet met at Kolozsvár in January 1607, it merely confirmed Rákóczi in his post as governor and declared that a new ruler would be elected after the late prince's burial.
Then the unexpected occurred, in the form of a letter from Archduke Matthias, the royal governor of Hungary. He instructed the principality's noble orders to desist from any action regarding the election until King Rudolph took the appropriate steps in accordance with the Vienna Peace Treaty. In fact, there was no allusion in the 1606 accord to any right that the king might possess regarding the election of Transylvania's prince. At the time of Bocskai's death, no concrete steps had yet been taken to implement the various clauses to the treaty. And in his letter, Archduke Matthias made clear that he did not regard the matter of Transylvania's autonomy to have been definitively settled by the 1606 accord.
In the event, his manoeuvre failed. To forestall any intervention, the Transylvanian diet set aside its earlier edict and, without waiting for the funeral, elected Zsigmond Rákóczi prince on 9 February, 1607. The noble orders thus presented the Viennese court and the Turkish Porte with a fait accompli, taking a decision on their future that went against the expressed wish of those external actors. To all appearances, the first independent act of newly autonomous Transylvania was a success, turning the letter of the {2-7.} treaties into reality. Although Rákóczi's election prompted great uproar outside the principality, it did not lead to tangible reprisals.
1. THE IMPOTENCE OF THE GREAT POWERS | 1. THE IMPOTENCE OF THE GREAT POWERS | The Policy of Avoiding War |