The Eastern War

Bethlen faced a hard decision, for the opportunity of action against the Habsburgs coincided in time with turbulence in the sphere of his eastern enemy. There were reports as early as 1614 that the chronic antagonism between the Tartars of the Turkish empire and the Cossacks of Poland was about to flare up once again. The Tartar khan was preparing to avenge his brother's murder, but, momentarily, international conflict did not ensue. Then, in the fall of 1615, the Polish-backed Movilă family returned to the voivodeships. The Porte promptly dispatched Pasha Skender, who had long experience in pacifying the region, and by September 1616 he had accomplished his task: once again, the Movilăs were in exile and the two voivodeships were governed by people subservient to the Porte. A clash between Poles and Turks was thus averted.

The political calm on Transylvania's eastern approaches proved to be short-lived. After several years of domestic strife, a political crisis erupted in the voivodeships. The key figure was one Caspar Gratiani, who enjoyed the confidence of all factions at the Porte and had been put in charge of Moldavia in early 1619. His mission was to resolve the internal conflict. However, hardly had this adventurous politician arrived, escorted by Skender, in Moldavia that he sought contact with the local, pro-Polish group. Perhaps he hoped to emulate Michael the Brave — who had allied himself with the Habsburgs to turn Wallachia from a Turkish vassal into conquering power — and, with Polish support, to make {2-58.} Moldavia independent of the Porte. And, again like Michael, he set his sights on the only realistic targets of conquest: the other voivodeship and Transylvania.

Unfortunately for Gratiani, his timing was bad. It coincided with the accession to the throne of Osman II, who was seeking new conquests to emulate Suleiman the Great; he lined the latter's armour with wadding before donning it to win laurels in battle. Obviously, Osman would not allow Gratiani's betrayal to go unpunished. He launched a war against Poland, and both sides suffered immense losses before peace was concluded in 1621. The main practical result was Gratiani's expulsion, for the war ended in a stalemate much like the one that prevailed between the Habsburgs and the Porte at the turn of the century. The two sides were not yet aware that the impasse would be lasting one. Poland was just starting to lose its conquered lands, and the Porte was about to experience a revolt by janissaries that would sweep Osman II off the throne and inaugurate a period of domestic military conflicts.

By all evidence, Bethlen deliberately tried to steer clear of this great eastern conflict. He had, like his predecessors, lost no time in establishing contact with the Romanian voivodes. Relations between Transylvania and the voivodeships had greatly deteriorated under Báthori, and Bethlen worked hard to undo the damage by concluding treaties of alliance. However, he remained aloof when the Movilăs attempted to regain power and when Skender forcefully restored order. Instead, evoking the transfer of Lippa, he reminded the Turks that he was the first Hungarian ruler who had voluntarily made such a gesture: 'What other country has ever shown such loyalty?' he asked rhetorically in a message to the Porte asking to be excused from participating in Skender's operations.[38]38. TMÁO I, p. 155. He exerted his diplomatic talents to win time, citing historical precedents to argue that the tributary princes of Transylvania did not customarily lend military assistance to the Turks. He evoked his own predicament: the 'Germans' might attack him at any moment. {2-59.} Finally, in late August 1617, he ran out of excuses and led an army into Moldavia. But his delaying tactics paid off: by the time he entered Suceava, the trouble was over, and he was not needed to fight alongside the Turks.

The Gratiani episode had nevertheless presented Bethlen with a difficult situation, for the clear aim of the new Moldavian voivode, the conquest of Transylvania and Wallachia, imperilled his rule. An even greater risk was that the political crisis would lead the pashas of the Divan to consider options that put in question the survival of Transylvania. To be sure, that danger was not new, for, after the death of Grand Vizier Nasuh, the Porte would manifest a certain coolness towards the principality. Bethlen was regarded — with justice — as having been Nasuh's man, and there had always been people in Constantinople who took a dim view of Transylvania's qualified independence. Once the hated grand vizier was disposed of, the opponents of his policies grew louder in their demand that the principality be fully subjugated. They began by demanding the return of Jenő, and did so with such force that, in spring 1619, Bethlen's ambassador begged his master to comply; he feared that a refusal would bring war. Gratiani's defection brought the region into even sharper focus. Some Turkish leaders toyed with the possibility of separating Transylvania's 'nations' into three distinct voivodeships, while others favored an even more radical solution: to erase Transylvania from the map and bring it under direct rule — along with the Romanian voivodeships — of the Turkish empire. This multiplicity of plans reflected the divisions of opinion in Turkish political circles; the Turkish military officials in Hungary were at odds with their colleagues at the Porte, as were the grand vizier's men with those of the Mufti. Amidst this political confusion, several Transylvanians were moved to lay claim to the throne, and when Bethlen's emissaries communicated with the Porte, they would be commonly invited to do likewise.

{2-60.} Curiously, Bethlen reacted with apparent indifference to these ominous developments. He did not retaliate against anyone and seemed to care little about the activity of claimants at the Porte or about the fate of his allies, the voivodes; nor did he try to conciliate his Turkish detractors at the Porte by sending them gifts. His complacency sprang from an objective assessment of the threats: he concluded that the contradictory rumors were a sign not of the Porte's potency but of its political disorganization and decay. Thus, instead of reacting subjectively and actively to the unfolding events in the Turkish empire, Bethlen chose to stay aloof. Ignoring pressures from the east, he concentrated on exploiting possibilities in the west.

In the summer of 1619, Bethlen showed little concern for Gratiani's fate or the impending attack on Poland. He approached the Porte not to pacify enemies but to win support from friends for his own plan: a military campaign against Hungary's new king, Ferdinand II, who had acceded to the throne on 20 March, 1619.