{2-90.} Transylvania and the Struggle for the Kingdom

Gabriel Bethlen had achieved a notable feat in raising Transylvania and princely authority to the levels that had prevailed in the 1570s and 1580s. At the outset, he was little more than the Turks' viceroy, yet he managed to become a treaty-bound partner of the great powers and, like Stephen Báthori and Zsigmond Báthori (in the first phase of his reign), a significant actor in international politics. One of Bethlen's admirers ranked him with King Matthias and Stephen Báthori, and, in truth, he was one of Transylvania's greatest rulers.

As Bethlen rose to international prominence, relations with his subjects took a peculiar turn. The latter observed his activities with a certain diffidence, and even his greatest foreign undertaking failed to arouse much sympathy at home. In May 1620, Bethlen tried to galvanize support at the meeting of the diet. He urged the delegates to avoid excluding themselves from 'so many useful things' and to join 'the confederation formed by the allied countries and Hungary'. After debate, the diet allowed that it was not 'averse' to the proposal but took no final decision. Instead, it despatched delegates to Besztercebánya with the charge of 'negotiating whatever lay within their competence'.[56]56. EOE 7, p. 540.

Thus in the spring of 1620, more than six months after Bethlen had launched his enterprise, neither the prince nor the feudal orders considered Transylvania to be an active participant. This was all the more anomalous since Bethlen had led into war the cavalry of the principality's militia as well as the nobility's private forces. Military historians estimate that some 10,000 Transylvanians were fighting on the Hungarian front in the autumn of 1619. Yet they had been mobilized without the approval, or even official acknowledgment, of the diet. No mention was made at the May 1619 diet of the planned attack on Ferdinand II, and Bethlen did not convoke the diet again before departing in August at the head of his troops. Technically, he was within his rights: Transylvanian law did not {2-91.} prescribe how an army should be deployed. But the avoidance of consultation indicates that Bethlen had no confidence in the judgment of the feudal orders. The diet seemed to justify his caution when it finally came to debate the question in the spring 1920, for it failed to show the slightest sign of enthusiasm.

The diet could not alter Bethlen's fait accompli, but it temporized on the proposed alliance and imposed severe restrictions on further deployment of the Transylvanian army. It approved use of the cavalry but refused to fund Bethlen's infantry: 'We need to reserve some of our forces to defend our homeland in case of necessity'. The Székelys were similarly grudging, 'holding back' the six hundred spearmen requested by Bethlen.[57]57. EOE, pp. 541-42. Thus only some of the peasant troops were allowed to join the prince. As for the cavalry, the nobles ruled at the spring diet that 'those who refuse may not be compelled by His Highness to join him'.[58]58. EOE, p. 542.

As is clear from these political developments in 1619–20, prince and country were not of one mind. Bethlen launched his enterprise with Transylvanian troops and the resources of the feudal orders, yet he did not regard the latter as participants. He had been waging war with these troops for half a year before he sent a message home urging the diet to join the alliance. The feudal orders took note of Bethlen's enterprise and raised no objections. They put some of Transylvania's armed forces at his disposal, but without espousing his cause: they did not adhere to the alliance or contribute the nobility's own troops. The feudal orders did not recognize or care about Bethlen's ultimate objective, which was to destroy the power of the Habsburgs through an multinational effort. Instead, they considered that Bethlen was fighting out of personal interest for the throne of Hungary.

Bethlen himself was fully aware of this state of mind, and he never attempted to mobilize the Transylvanians by referring to the destruction of the Habsburg power. He justified his first campaign by referring to repeated violation of the peace treaties concluded {2-92.} with 'the Austrian family' and to the Hungarians' call for help ('they found us', noted Bethlen).[59]59. EOE, p. 536. There is a similar absence of any appeal to emotions in his subsequent writings and messages. Bethlen preferred to persevere in his crusade against the Habsburgs without relying on the problematic support of Transylvania.

In fact, the principality remained largely unaffected and untouched by the wars. The diets convoked by Bethlen at Pozsony and Besztercebánya dealt exclusively with the affairs of royal Hungary. Of the eighty-three clauses enacted by the diets, only one had any relevance to Transylvania. The 31st clause, passed at Besztercebánya, stated that in the interest of good neighborliness, Hungary and Transylvania should send back each other's runaway villeins — with the proviso that 'the Transylvanian gentry may not apply this clause before a similar one is enacted in Transylvania'.[60]60. I. Katona, Historia critica, p. 536. Apart from this, the principality earned passing mention in Bethlen's electoral charter: clause 11 stipulated the preservation of Hungary's borders with Transylvania, as well as with Poland and its other neighbours.

Nor did the Transylvanians expect greater attention. With respect to the Besztercebánya diet, their only request — 'since Transylvania and Hungary have the same ruler' — was for the measure regarding runaway villeins.[61]61. EOE 7, p. 543. If the personal union of the two countries had remained in effect, perhaps they would have had more common issues to settle. However, the war had led not to the confirmation of personal union but to the peculiar division of authority over the seven counties; thus there was no structured relationship between Transylvania and any part of Hungary. The seven counties' feudal orders attended the Hungarian royal diets as well as meetings called by the prince in the fiscal centre of Kassa. Neither Bethlen nor the notables of Upper Hungary wished to create a constitutional union of the counties with Transylvania. Although the Transylvanian diet did make a feeble attempt to win control of the revenues from the seven counties, the prince insisted {2-93.} that it be administered separately, arguing that he had received the counties as a personal grant. Bethlen's income was growing, but this new income covered an only tiny portion of the prince's expenditures, and thus the contribution of the seven counties did not lighten the tax burden in the principality. In 1625, for example, Bethlen expended on luxuries four times the amount raised in Upper Hungary. Meanwhile, in the three years following his acquisition of the counties, taxes more than doubled in Transylvania.

Bethlen's court acquired the splendor that reflects absolute power in the period after his first military campaign. He may have taken on the task of governance out of a sense of obligation, and believed that he was doing God's bidding, but he clearly enjoyed the trappings of power. Few have answered the call of duty with such sincere delight as Gabriel Bethlen.

The prince enjoyed conducting diplomacy and writing letters, and he never tired of warfare. At the same time, he loved luxury, and probably drew the greatest pleasure from enhancing the pomp and splendor of his court. The yellow, aquamarine, and red fur cloaks, the rich fur caps in hues of green and blue that he left behind attest to his taste for vivid colors; even his nightshirts were colorful. Bethlen's jewelry was worth a fortune; he bought a helmet ornament for 10,000 thalers, and paid a thousand gold pieces for a single egret feather. He was a gourmet, and liked to send off for exotic foods such as salt water fish, oysters, tropical fruit and sweets. It is not known whether he liked to dance, but he would regularly order masks from abroad. Singers, actors, German and Italian musicians entertained at his court.

Until the early 1620s, Bethlen's lifestyle was no more luxurious than that of a wealthy Hungarian aristocrat. Judging from the pattern of his expenditures, his demands became more extravagant around the time that he began negotiations for the hand of the Habsburg princess. In 1624, the prince acquired in a single purchase over a thousand carpets as well as 150 wall-brackets. In early {2-94.} 1625, he bought 31 rings, and expended 1,000 forints on bead-threading as well as in excess of 12,000 thalers for the refashioning of old jewelry. That year's expenditures on luxury goods amounted to 450,000 forints and close to 4,000 gold coins. This was an enormous sum; the expenditure in gold was half as much as the tribute paid by Transylvania to the Turks. In 1626, Bethlen spent half the year soldiering in royal Hungary but continued to feed his taste for luxury, disbursing 370,000 forints and 4,457 gold coins.

In the 17th century, rulers considered such expenditures to be just as essential as the funding of military campaigns and other state functions. The burden on the country of the prince's lifestyle can be assessed in relation to his total income and expenditures. Until 1619, Bethlen's spending on luxury goods is but a small fraction of his total domestic expenditures and of the irregularly-paid tribute to the Turks. The 1619 campaign in royal Hungary, funded in part from that region as well as from foreign sources, cost Transylvania 300,000 forints; luxury expenditures did not rise significantly that year. Between 1619 and 1624, when Bethlen conducted his first two campaigns, 50 percent of his revenues went for the war effort, 29 percent for domestic purposes, 6.7 percent for the tribute to the Porte, and 6.1 percent for luxury items. The proportion of war expenses was average for the times: this activity consumed 60 percent of the revenues of France's Louis XIII and as much as 72 percent in the case of Savoy.

After 1624, Bethlen's total expenditures did not increase by much, but the pattern of allocation changed radically. In 1625, when there was no military campaign under way and no tribute was paid, 75 percent of his total revenues of 614,000 forints went for luxury goods and only 25 percent for other domestic purposes. By contrast, in 1626, when Bethlen went to war for six moths, his total expenditures were in the order of 720,000 forints, of which 21 percent went for military purposes, a similar proportion for domestic needs, 4.8 percent for the tribute, and 53.5 percent for luxury goods.

{2-95.} The level of expenditure in these two years, one of peace, the other of war, gives a measure of the principality's financial circumstances. It seems that the maximum revenue that could be generated in Transylvania was around 600,000–700,000 forints. The prince could raise up to half a million forints without great difficulty; beyond that level, he had to choose between force of arms and the resplendent trappings of princely power to impress his enemies.