Uprising in the Peasant Counties

Transylvania's environment was thus marked by uncommon calm when György Rákóczi I became ruling prince; the three changes in the office in 1629–30 had not provoked intervention by the great powers. Within the country, on the other hand, his election induced a mighty storm, for the terms imposed costs that others would pay. The treaty with Ferdinand II required Rákóczi not only to settle the hajdú problem, but also — in clause four — to allow the stationing of an imperial garrison at Ónod until such time as one of his sons established residence in royal Hungary. Since the boys were not yet in their teens, many years would pass before they would be old enough to become a quasi-hostage in the part of Hungary ruled by the Habsburgs. The implication of the clause was perfectly clear: Rákóczi put Ónod, a fortress at the mouth of the Sajó River, and his family's oldest stronghold, under the king's authority as a guarantee of his peaceful intentions. In effect, Rákóczi surrendered the domains lying between the eastern border of Borsod County and the northern part of Gömör, for these could be readily controlled from Ónod in case of war.

{2-110.} This concession was undoubtedly a blow the prestige of the Rákóczi family, but since it did not significantly alter the balance of forces, it was a price worth paying for the princely throne. At the same time, it carried great risks for the rural population, for the latter would be the first to suffer from changes in ownership and from any military action that the king might choose to launch from Ónod. The concession also created uncertainty with respect to the Turks. Ónod, located across from Eger, was a strategically important part of not only the Rákóczi domains' defenses but also the fortified frontier with Turkish-dominated Hungary. Until then, the garrison — consisting of troops raised by the region's landowners — had acted in defense of its own farms and those of its relatives against the threat of raids by the Turks at Eger. There was no assurance that imperial troops brought from afar would be similarly motivated.

Indeed, legend has it that after the transfer of authority, the people of Ónod 'wrote to the Turks requesting that the latter look after their own domain and let the Christians take care of those who were not Ottoman subjects.'[70]70. TT 1884, pp. 107-8. Whether fact or fiction, the story reflected the peasantry's apprehensions at the change. Previously, the Rákóczis could offer some protection even to the villeins in Turkish-ruled Heves County — to be sure, not out of altruism, but because the family had large estates in the vine-growing district of Gyöngyös-Visonta. These estates had offered some assurance of peace to the local peasantry, and the latter perceived that the transfer of Ónod to imperial control could bring unwelcome change.

The local people felt that the mighty had abandoned them, and their anxiety led them to rebel. The peasant movement began in the Sajó Valley, where the situation was particularly tense: the previous summer, even before Rákóczi became Transylvania's prince, royal troops had been stationed in villages that belonged to him, and their depredations infuriated the peasantry. As far as is known, the initial organizers of the revolt were Imre Csuka and János Bonta, who came from two prosperous villages on the Rákóczi domain of {2-111.} Felsővadász. In their quest for deliverance from the rampaging soldiery, they turned to methods refined by the hajdús. They may have observed that in the case of the latter, great lords had become allied with lowly folk just like themselves. When they failed to find a noble patron, the peasant captains, led by Péter Császár, took it upon themselves to organize the rebel movement. Their call to arms was disseminated in the villages around Ónod, in Borsod, Gömör, Abaúj, and Torna, and as far as Turkish-ruled Heves County. By late July 1630, they were making plans for a mass meeting at Garadna, in Abaúj County, where an assembly of the county's nobles was to convene on 16 August. They may have hoped to hold a joint meeting with the latter. Preferring to neither confront nor support the peasant movement, the nobles persuaded the latter's leaders to shift their meeting to the market town of Gönc. The peasant fighters had been gathering since early August, but they faced no enemy, for the royal troops had been redirected to fight the Swedes in Silesia. It was thus in a relatively calm atmosphere that the peasant militants met at Gönc to elect their captain-general, Péter Császár, and his staff. By then, the dual orientation of the movement had become apparent.

The radical wing was led by Imre Csuka, an elderly, highly-respected villein farmer. He and his followers not only sought to assure their physical security but also advanced social claims. It was reported that they carried around a flag left over from the Dózsa rebellion and were searching for an important letter which — they believed — revealed the measures taken on their behalf, against the landowners, by the emperor. The movement's other wing, which had a more dynamic leadership, respected the legal relationship between the peasant counties and the noble county; emphasizing that the looming threats affected nobles as well as peasants, this wing sought to find a noble leader.

Following the meeting at Gönc, the peasant captain Ambrus Nagy made an approach to Dávid Zólyomi. The latter referred the {2-112.} peasant leaders to György Rákóczi I — perhaps because he identified Nagy with the peasant movement on Rákóczi's estates, or perhaps because he was still hoping to draw Rákóczi into attacking the Habsburgs. In January 1632, in a step that sealed his fate, Péter Császár headed off to Gyulafehérvár. Until then, Palatine Esterházy and the ruling class of Upper Hungary had not responded to the emerging movement in the peasant counties. Indeed, their passivity led Rákóczi to suspect that Esterházy himself had instigated the revolt: for while the movement threatened other landowners as well, it was focused on his domains and put him in a particularly difficult situation. The uprising could only be quelled by force, yet he, as Prince of Transylvania, was not free to send troops to his domains in royal Hungary. On the other hand, it was not in his interest to fully suppress a revolt that promised to embarrass the king — a consideration that led the palatine to suspect it was Rákóczi who had incited the peasants to rebel.

For the first time, Rákóczi had to face a peculiar dilemma: his interests as ruler of Transylvania did not fully coincide with his interests as a landowner in royal Hungary, and, as prince, he was less able to defend those estates than any other landowner in the region. The response he gave to Péter Császár reflected his ambivalence: if they cut short their rebellion, he would protect them against any reprisals. To be sure, such reprisals could also come from Rákóczi, who was himself an aggrieved landowner.

Yet, at Gyulafehérvár, Rákóczi was the unquestioned ruler, and Péter Császár's initiative altered the nature of the problem. Apprehensive about the possibility of an alliance between the peasantry, the hajdús, and the prince, the previously passive nobles of Upper Hungary sprang into action. On 2 March 1632, they brought Császár to trial before an improvised court at Kassa. The principal charges were fraternization with the Turks, the Swedes, and the Transylvanian enemy. After dreadful torture, the peasant leader was put to death, and his body quartered.

{2-113.} Until then, the peasants had taken little significant action against the landowners, but Péter Császár's ghastly end provoked a wild outburst. An assembly in Kassa of the counties of Upper Hungary took a stand in favor of peaceful settlement. Responding to a promise of immunity, the majority of insurgents endorsed an agreement with Upper Hungary's captain-general on April 3. According to its terms, they were to return home without delay, surrender their weapons to the county, and refrain from further meetings or rebellious action on pain of death; all grievances would have to be submitted to the captain-general. Those who stayed in arms headed for Transylvania, but they were intercepted on István Bethlen's domain, at Ecsed, by the combined forces of Várad's garrison and the Transylvanian hajdús, under the command of István Bethlen Jr. and Zólyomi. According to the prince's chronicler, their orders were to make the rebels lay down their arms and to let them go after routine punishment. Yet, as late as November, the local people were complaining that 'not since the time of Basta had armies wrought so much misery'.[71]71. EOE 9, p. 359.