| A Precariously Balanced Policy | 3. THE STRUGGLE FOR HUNGARIAN STATEHOOD | European Interests and the Risk of Isolation |
On 19 March 1675, Mihály Teleki reported to the prince that an ambassador had arrived from Poland with the mission of 'renewing [his country's] friendship' with Transylvania. The ambassador was accompanied by a 'terrible old and sickly' Frenchman Roger Akakia, who had been dispatched in great secrecy by Louis XIV's special envoy to Poland, De Forbin, Bishop of Marseille.[82] In terms of the agreement concluded between Akakia and the prince on 28 {2-343.} April 1675 at Fogaras, the French king undertook to provide assistance — a fixed sum of money, and Polish dragoons — to the exiles, on two conditions: that Apafi allow Mihály Teleki to become the exiles' general, and that he obtain the Porte's consent to the 'election of a Hungarian king according to that country's ancient customs and liberties'.[83]
The Fogaras Agreement was a diplomatic breakthrough, for it lent international support to the principality's independent foreign policy. Relations with Poland, which had taken a turn for the worse in 1657, were restored to normalcy; and by allying itself with France (a country at war with the Habsburgs), Transylvania would become a participant in the high politics of Europe. In keeping with contemporary diplomatic conventions, the Fogaras accord signified no more than a commitment to pursue substantive negotiations. An actual treaty of alliance lay at the end of a strictly prescribed process of consultations on the modalities of cooperation. Given the constraints on the principality's freedom of action, that protracted process entailed grave risks for Transylvania. The Habsburg government spared no expense to keep up to date on foreign developments. Transylvania's ambassador, Kristóf Paskó, reported that Vienna's representative at the Porte had 'purchased' the text of the Fogaras Agreement from the French ambassador's deputy in Hadrianopolis. Predictably, the accord, with its allusive wording, provoked suspicion and alarm at the Viennese court, and it led the Privy Council, ever protective of the dynasty's interests, to take all possible steps to forestall a French-Transylvanian alliance. Vienna conveyed through the Hungarian chancellor, Tamás Pálffy, an offer of negotiation to Apafi, and also pursued diplomatic initiatives at the Porte; meanwhile, the imperial forces in Hungary were redeployed. Apafi and his circle were experienced enough not to rebuff the overture; in a succession of responses, they outlined their terms and their proposals on how the emperor might settle the Hungarian question. In the meantime, the new captain-general of Upper-{2-344.} Hungary, Count Strassoldo, occupied Debrecen and held it to ransom, as if to demonstrate that the Habsburg emperor disposed of vastly greater forces than Apafi. Chancellor János Bethlen gave a realistic assessment of the military balance: 'Today's German army is capable of inflicting great damage, but it lacks the strength to attain major objectives.'[84]
The Porte posed a greater threat to the project of an alliance between France and Transylvania. The Habsburg government was well aware that Transylvania had doubly transgressed the limits imposed by the sultan's suzerainty: it had backed the exiles in order to expand its military capacity for an offensive campaign, and it had engaged in negotiations to form an alliance with external powers. The grand vizier Ahmed Köprülü, a steadfast champion of peace with the Habsburgs, passed away on 2 November 1676. Transfers of power normally produced shifts in policy, but the changes instituted by his successor, the 'bloodthirsty' Mustapha Kara, were exceptionally radical. The new grand vizier did not like the pros-pect, evoked in a clause of the Fogaras Agreement, of union be-tween Hungary and Transylvania, but he momentarily concentrated his energies on the Russo–Turkish war.
The Fogaras Agreement treated the Hungarian exiles as a distinct power-group. The French evidently regarded Imre Thököly as a guarantee of continuity in Hungarian policy, for this 17-year-old was identified as the top leader of the exiles. The impatient exiles called for an early offensive, and Apafi's circle feared that if they came to constitute an autonomous force in Transylvania, the consequences might be disastrous. The one way to preserve unity would have been to launch an invasion on Hungary. In fact, military preparations were under way in the autumn of 1676, and Teleki had been given full military authority. But Apafi was held back from launching a campaign both by the transfer of leadership in Constantinople and, to a lesser extent, by the procrastination of the French. Thus the only military action consisted of raids by bands of {2-345.} exiles into Upper-Hungary. Ferenc Rákóczi I, who had willed that his infant son (and nominal heir to the Transylvanian throne) be put under Emperor Leopold's tutelage, died while trying to flee.
The imposed delay only heightened discord within Transylvania's political elite. Teleki pressed for an early offensive; Miklós Bethlen mistrusted French intentions; and Béldi, who regarded the Turks as the major threat, tried to organize a dissident movement. According to János Haller, Chancellor János Bethlen 'considered that the prospects were gloomy for our fatherland and nation, and especially for ourselves [...] and attributed this entirely to the discord among us, for we are unable to agree on a single policy, even if the majority may conceive of a good one'.[85]
Apafi pulled through the stressful waiting period by resorting to devices commonly used by contemporary rulers. He invested his wife, Anna Bornemissza, with governing powers and put her in charge of state business; he tried to pacify the feudal orders with a rash of laws and decrees and took time off for prolonged hunting parties. The prince's family circumstances also impelled him to persevere in his prudent policy: none of his former children had survived, yet, in fall 1676, his wife gave birth to a new son and heir. The prince and other members of the political elite were growing impatient in their quest for opportunities; the knowledge that they faced great risks upset the always tenuous balance between self-interest and public interest. Cases of unbridled abuse of power and of counterfeiting money were brought before the diet. Bishop Topheus observed that Béldi's jail was never empty of 'clerks, craftsmen, and honest noblemen', and that he resorted to force to acquire more villeins.[86] Miklós Bethlen and others engaged in the profitable exchange of money. Europe's courtiers and other aristocrats were generally purposeful in their ambition to enhance their family's wealth and prestige. Well-educated and fond of pomp and circumstance, they assimilated the ways of the court: they indulged in intrigue, and were at once adaptable and willing to take risks.
{2-346.} However, one feature did distinguish the principality's politicians from those of other countries: their constant sense of dread. They feared that if 'the Roman Emperor defeated the French and the Swedes', he would dispatch additional troops to Hungary. They were apprehensive when the Porte laid charges and deposed the voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia. They were afraid because 'the Hungarian nation was considerably weakened' in its capacity to oppose Vienna, because 'there was little to choose between Turks and Germans, they will swallow us up', because the French king procrastinated, because 'our nation is indifferent to law, truth, and liberty', because 'deception reigns in the world', because the pretenders to the princely throne are 'flitting about', and because, as Miklós Bethlen observed, 'everyone is waiting to pounce on whatever I do, say, or write'.[87]
The bloody spectre of a beheaded Dénes Bánffy haunted Transylvania's politicians, and fear led them to adopt defensive shells. Anna Bornemissza and others close to the prince — László Székely, István Naláczi, János Nemes — kept a close watch on the lords councillor. Teleki tried to control the French connection and to gain exclusive authority over the exiles; he squandered much prestige and energy in recruiting followers. Pál Béldi, for his part, sought to take advantage of the prudence exhibited by the elderly chancellor and his cosmopolitan son, and to exploit the feudal grievances of Székelys and Saxons. The prince's inner circle proved quicker off the mark. László Székely and István Nalóczi spurred Apafi to take action at the spring 1676 meeting of the council at Fogaras and the three men were arrested. The elderly and ailing chancellor, János Bethlen, was placed under house arrest at his manor in Keresd; his son and Béldi were put in irons and thrown into a dungeon. When, a year later, they provided guarantees of loyalty and were freed on bail, they found a much-altered political climate.
{2-347.} Following the visits of two French abbés, Forval and Révérand, to Transylvania, a treaty of alliance was signed in Warsaw on 27 May 1672 by the Marquis de Béthune, Louis XIV's new ambassador to Poland, and the prince's envoy, Dávid Absolon. On July 17, the French king ratified what must have been one of the most artfully-worded treaties ever concluded by his country. France would give 100,000 thalers towards the costs of mounting an offensive against the Habsburgs. The principality would participate only to the extent of providing a general and his staff to lead the exiles and of continuing to provide shelter and protection for the latter. Even so, Transylvania had insisted on multiple guarantees. Louis XIV agreed that an eventual peace treaty with the emperor would have to address the interests of Transylvania and the exiles; if this proved impossible, France would continue to stand by the principality. The king would also back Transylvania in case the Porte refused to approve the treaty and resorted to punitive measures. The principality's precarious situation 'between fire and water' was reflected in the weight given in the treaty to a defensive alliance against both Habsburgs and Turks. To be sure, Transylvania also took on obligations: it was now impelled to mount an early offensive not only by Hungary's need and the impatience of the exiles, but also by the terms of its alliance with France.
Apafi was aware of the risks. The proclamation of the enterprise, and the first orders, were probably drafted by Miklós Bethlen, who had fully committed himself to the prince's policy. These initial communications clearly reflected how difficult it was to pursue an independent policy under Turkish overlordship. Having received word that France had ratified the treaty of alliance, the prince formally notified the exiles that 'we wish to send some troops to help liberate the Hungarian nation and fatherland, which has been robbed of its spiritual and physical freedom.'[88] His first step was to dispatch emissaries to the Porte but, not wishing to lose time, he prepared for both of the contingencies evoked in the {2-348.} Franco–Transylvanian treaty. He appointed Thököly to replace Wesselényi and ordered him to join the exiles as their general; thus Thököly could carry on as the ostensible leader of the enterprise even if the Porte once again vetoed Transylvania's initiative. A similar calculation inspired the instructions given to Teleki, who was in charge of military operations: if the prince was compelled by the Porte to recall him, Teleki could ignore the order without fear of incurring charges of insubordination.
The grand vizier proved even more devious than the prince. Without objecting to the French alliance, the Porte suggested that the offensive be put off to spring 1678, by which time it expected to have terminated its Russian campaign. However, by the autumn of 1677, the first French officers had already arrived in the exiles' camp, French and Polish reinforcements were on their way, and Thököly was forming cavalry and infantry regiments out of the troops that had been dismissed from the border forts. In October, exile units under the command of Colonel Boham defeated General Schmidt's imperial forces at Nyalábvár. Meanwhile, the Habsburg government made its own preparations to counter the anticipated offensive; in early 1678, it dispatched three sizeable military contingents to Hungary. The allies could not afford to wait, and Apafi had to assume the risk of Turkish retaliation.
On 5 April 1678, Transylvania's prince issued a declaration to the people of Hungary: he had, in alliance with the French and Polish kings, 'taken up arms to liberate them from the heavy yoke of servitude'. He urged Hungarians to 'consider, with open eyes and sober reasoning, the prospect of submitting to the protection of the mighty Turkish emperor'.[89] His caution was understandable, for the Porte had yet to give its assent. Yet Apafi affirmed that 'the Porte had a particularly high regard for his approach to Hungarian affairs and wanted Teleki to proceed'.[90] The exiles had met on 5 April 1678 at Somkút and, in the presence of the French king's envoy, elected as their 'principal leader', Mihály Teleki, Transylvania's {2-349.} chancellor. However, weeks passed without word from the Porte. There was still a chance that the Turks would veto the whole venture and that the pasha of Várad would interpose his forces.
There was an even riskier possibility. The grand vizier could decide to give armed assistance to the prince, and thus pave the way for Hungary's subjection to the Turks. That was not among Apafi's war aims; nor did his allies, the kings of France and Poland, supply money, officers, and even troops with the intention of expanding the Turks' domain. Apafi's proclamations reflected a prudent inclination to distance himself from the Turks. He made clear that the war was designed to assist Hungary; its rallying cry was Pro Deo et pro Patria. The Hungarian nation's growing distress could have evil consequences for Transylvania, and he therefore wished to liberate Hungary by force of arms; his only goal was to secure lasting peace in both tormented countries.
In addition, Teleki had stressed that the 'attack would not lead to the oppression of Catholics'.[91] His standing orders to the troops imposed strict discipline and specified that no one should be made to suffer because of his religion; those who harassed Catholics would be executed. He also warned his forces not to let any captured fortress fall into 'foreign' — i.e. Turkish — hands.
Some of Transylvania's aristocrats did not sympathize with Apafi and the political line that he pursued in the shadow of Ottoman might. Béldi anticipated that, having launched a campaign without the Turks' permission, Apafi would end up like György Rákóczi II. Driven by personal revenge and reckless ambition, and calculating that his time had come, Béldi spurred other aristocrats to resist, incited the Saxons and Székelys with reminders of their grievances, and offered his services to the Porte. Among those who rallied to his movement, several must have shared János Haller's belief that if there was to be a change in leadership, a new guard should be ready to step into the breach and forestall any attempt by the Porte to bring a new prince from abroad. No one wanted Dávid {2-350.} Zólyomi, who was kept in reserve as a prince-in-waiting in Constantinople. In the event, the conspirators were unmasked, and although Béldi sought refuge with the Turks, his plans did not bear fruit.
When Apafi learned of Béldi's flight, he dispatched his new chancellor, Farkas Bethlen, along with representatives of the three nations, to the grand vizier; they bore a gift of 80,000 thalers. By this time, Mustapha Kara had set his sights on Vienna, and he assessed Transylvania's domestic troubles in the context of his own strategies. Aware that Apafi had assembled an army and was allied to the French king, the grand vizier chose to find Béldi guilty and had him imprisoned in the Jedikula. Farkas Bethlen's delegation headed home on 22 April, armed with the sultan's firman confirming the princely status of Apafi.
On 2 June 1678, Teleki's army, composed of exiles, former frontier troops, and French as well as Polish units, marched off for Hungary in an enterprise that engaged Transylvania's prestige as well. Stopped short at the Tisza River, the army veered northward toward Ungvár, where it split into two. With the larger part of the army, Teleki laid siege to Érsekújvár. The attackers failed to prevent the imperial forces of Dünewald and Würmb from joining up; the gates to the town remained shut, and fearing the plague, a dispirited Teleki withdrew on 15 August Kővár. Meanwhile, in a bold and swift military manoeuvre, Thököly led the cavalry regiments of former border troops, reinforced by French and Polish units, to capture the mining towns.
| A Precariously Balanced Policy | 3. THE STRUGGLE FOR HUNGARIAN STATEHOOD | European Interests and the Risk of Isolation |