Confederation with the Hungarian Kingdom | 5. THE PRINCIPALITY OF FERENC RÁKÓCZI II | The Gubernium and Habsburg Military Rule |
The government institutions that emerged in Hungary and Transylvania after 1703 were amalgams of the Habsburg and Hungarian feudal systems. This development was induced both by the weight of the past and by more immediate, foreign factors. In its new association with Hungary, Transylvania's utility lay primarily in the realm of foreign relations.
Rákóczi was determined to expand the international political links of the new Hungarian state. He sought alliances, or at least a common understanding, with the anti-Habsburg powers. He also wished to make the relationship between Hungary and Transylvania, and the Habsburg dynasty an issue of European diplomacy, so that the other great powers would mediate in the eventual negotiations and terminate the wars over Hungary and Transylvania in the context of a general European peace treaty. Thanks to its long experience in diplomatic relations with Sweden, Poland, the Protestant-German principalities, and the voivodeships of Molda-via and Wallachia, Transylvania could assist Rákóczi in attaining both of these objectives. In spring 1704, Mihály Henter and István Dániel Vargyasi visited the two voivodes, Constantin Brîncoveanu {2-416.} and Mihai Racoviţă; armed with a Manifestum that summed up the causes and aims of the war, they sought to consolidate neighbourly relations and lay the ground for an eventual alliance. They were followed by Mihály Mikes, who briefed the voivodes on the decisions of the Gyulafehérvár diet.
The Treaty of Karlóca (1699), and in particular the imposition of religious union, had unfavourable consequences for Wallachia and Moldavia, and the two voivodeships were tempted to join the forces that resisted Habsburg expansion. As early as spring 1704, Moldavia's voivode, Brîncoveanu, informed Rákóczi that he acknowledged the legitimacy of latter's struggle. Constantin Cantacuzino, Wallachia's de facto foreign minister and leader of the boyars' party, not only entertained close personal contact with Transylvanians but showed growing interest in, and sympathy for Rákóczi's political endeavours. However, Wallachia's voivode chose to temporize: constrained by the HabsburgTurkish agreement, he did not want to sever contact with the Viennese government, while the Porte, which had a determining influence on his foreign policy, failed to give him clear instructions. Although the Turks kept a firmer grip on the less influential Moldavia because it was Russia's immediate neighbour, the supporters of Antioh Cantemir, who became voivode in succession to the pro-Rákóczi Racoviţă, also kept in close touch with Transylvania.
In 17046, the benevolent neutrality shown by the two voivodeships showed signs of evolving into closer political partnership. Cantacuzino, and, to a lesser extent, Moldavia's voivode were helping to lay the ground for an agreement between Rákóczi and Russia's Czar Peter the Great. In keeping with contemporary European custom, the first diplomatic soundings involved cultural matters. Rákóczi's tolerant and openly anti-union policy toward the Greek Orthodox Church fostered a closer relationship between the HungarianTransylvanian confederation and the Romanian voivodeships.
{2-417.} Transylvania's weight in foreign relations showed itself most clearly in the context of the prince's diplomatic efforts to secure international mediation and guarantees. England and Holland had economic interests in Transylvania. Traders in these two countries had long pressed for peace in the Balkans and for free passage through the former Turkish-ruled territories; loans to the Habsburg court were secured partly by Transylvania's mineral resources. Transylvania's Protestant intelligentsia had strong cultural links to Holland and England. Thanks to English and Dutch mediation, peace negotiations were initiated in fall 1704, Transylvania being represented by Mihály Mikes. Although the talks soon collapsed, reports in Daniel Defoe's Weekly Review, along with Dutch and French pamphlets, testified to widespread European interest in independent Transylvania as a haven of religious freedom and a factor in the continental balance of power.
English and Dutch mediation led to another round of negotiation, in summer 1706 at Nagyszombat, between the HungarianTransylvanian confederation and Joseph I, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Hungary. The Habsburg government ostensibly acknowledged Transylvania's independence, but it insisted that Rákóczi abdicate from the principality. Rákóczi declared that Transylvania would not be an obstacle to peace, for if the two countries' independent statehood within the Habsburg empire was guaranteed, he was ready to relinquish the principality.
Yet Transylvania was the main reason why these talks, too, ended inconclusively. The dynastic party, led by Prince Eugene of Savoy, had become predominant in the Habsburg government, and it did not favour a settlement based on an inter-state treaty complete with international guarantees; moreover, the party insisted that Transylvania's historic status under the Hungarian crown had to be preserved. Thus Transylvania's representatives Mihály Mikes, Simon Kemény, Mihály Teleki, and Lőrinc Pekry did not have the opportunity to present their case. In response to the Hungarian{2-418.} Transylvanian confederation's peace proposal, the emperor's spokesmen declared that, historically, Transylvania had belonged to the Hungarian Crown; that it had been liberated from the Turkish yoke by the emperor's arms; and that, having sealed an agreement with the Transylvanian estates and 'statuses' (i.e. the Saxons and Székelys), the emperor was not prepared to alter the terms of the Karlóca Treaty. Evoking the rights of Transylvania's feudal estates, the Austrians argued that the Transylvanian and Hungarian allies were not entitled to confiscate land from its rightful owner or question its ownership; nor could they alter the form of the government or amend the privileges of the Transylvanian 'statuses'. The Habsburg government was equally adamant in rejecting the proposal for an international guarantee of any settlement between the HungarianTransylvanian Confederation and the Habsburg dynasty.
After the talks collapsed, Rákóczi issued a declaration that the Habsburg government's refusal to give a hearing to Transylvania's representatives signified that 'the country was condemned to the miserable fate of perpetual serfdom'. He went on: 'For what reason does the House of Austria wish to acquire Transylvania by force of arms, if not to consolidate its power, indeed, its very foundation? It is easy to see why some ministers would rather have their hands cut off than allow the country to separate. Obviously the House of Austria anticipates a shortcoming on the male line, in which case the female line could keep Hungary bridled by way of Transylvania.'[132] In a pamphlet aimed at the rest of Europe, Pál Ráday, the spokesman of Rákóczi's party, took a similar line in blaming the Habsburg court for the talks' failure. He maintained that the right of states to independence derived from the laws of nature, and charged that the Habsburg government had economic motives for clinging to Transylvania. Hungary's people, wrote Ráday, believe that it is their duty, as participants in the confederation, to assist the Transylvanians, and they request other states to {2-419.} restrain the Habsburg empire from imposing its rule on Transylvania. Ráday also reiterated the hoary argument that Transylvania was a key factor in the preservation of the European balance of power.
When the ceasefire came into effect, the imperial high command transferred Rabutin and some 20,000 troops to Hungary. Rákóczi's reorganized forces had reoccupied large areas of Transylvania in early 1706, and by autumn, the entire country except for Szeben, Brassó, and Fogaras was under his control. The prince appointed Lőrinc Pekry military commander of Transylvania, and, with the principality once again free of imperial troops, the leaders of the Hungarian confederation moved to reorganize it in accordance with the economic and military decisions taken by the Senate at its meeting in Miskolc.
The central government needed Transylvania, and for reasons of politics as well as economics. An industry to serve the military had been set up in Transylvania six months later than in Hungary, and it was not only smaller but also less centralized than the Hungarian. However, the income from the salt mines, the iron industry at Toroczka, and the mercury, gold and copper mines of the Érc Mountains were important assets, and, as János Pápai reported, Transylvania had much to contribute in the economic realm. The Treasury's mills in Hunyad County and Csík produced plenty of iron, and it was of higher quality than that made in Hungary; Wallachia's voivode was ready to trade wool for copper; and the output of Transylvanian felt-makers and Saxon craftsmen was as indispensable as the income from the glassworks, paper mills, and salt as well as gold mines. In the spring of 1706, Count János Gottfried Hellenbach, an outstanding doctor and economist who was lord chamberlain and financial councillor in the Rákóczi government, sent his son with money and a group of miners, smelter-workers, and minters to open up new mines in Transylvania.
{2-420.} After Rabutin had left, Transylvania's aristocrats, nobles, towns, and other feudal communities once again swore allegiance to the prince. However, Rákóczi ordered that the property of those who had shown disloyalty be confiscated. Eager to implement his plans for reorganizing taxation, public finance, and the army, he called for a meeting of the diet. Pekry was charged with securing the feudal estates' endorsement of the central government's policies; on 9 October 1706, Rákóczi instructed him to impress on Transylvania's nobles the example of the Hungarians, who were 'delighted to accept the imposition of certain financial contributions', and to 'make the statuses favourably disposed toward the imposition of a financial contribution'.[133]
In the event, the Transylvanian estates preferred to govern in their accustomed fashion, and the decisions taken by the diet on 27 October 1706, at Medgyes, failed to meet Rákóczi's expectations. The circulation of copper coinage was endorsed, a war tax was imposed, the revenue from salt was allocated to the maintenance of the army, and foreign trade was made a state monopoly. However, the diet left unaltered the nobility's exemption from taxes; allowed a few aristocrats to take over management of the economy; took no practical steps to feed the army; and completely ignored the issue of a standing army.
For reasons of foreign as well as domestic policy, Rákóczi could lose no time in consolidating his authority in Transylvania. In fall 1706, France, having suffered military reverses in Italy and Spain, sent out peace feelers, and European diplomatic circles anticipated an early and general peace settlement. Rákóczi hastened to remind Louis XIV that, in keeping with his commitments, he should not forget about Transylvania and Hungary: 'Be sure to include us in the general peace treaty.'[134] Rákóczi sent similar messages to England's Queen and the Dutch Estates, asking them to back Hungary's and Transylvania's case at the general peace talks. However, in order to lead this process to a successful conclusion, {2-421.} Rákóczi needed to preserve his authority in Hungary, and circumstances did not work in his favour.
Over the second half of 1706, the conflicts between the Hungarian confederation's political parties took a turn for the worse. Unrest among villein-soldiers, economic problems, and resistance of the counties all contributed to a deepening crisis. At a meeting, in Rozsnyó, which lasted from 17 December 1706 to 5 January 1707, the prince's council adopted a series of remedial measures. It decided to institute freedom of commerce and to raise two million forints in taxes; and to charge committees, composed of members of Rákóczi's party, with investigating the situation in mining and among producers of saltpetre and iron.
The council also decided to settle the matter of a constitution, and it drew up plans to convene the Transylvanian and Hungarian diets. This important initiative was taken in the interest of securing international recognition of the Hungarian Confederation and the Transylvanian Principality; a second objective, not unrelated to the first, was to strengthen central authority at the expense of the feudal estates. Rákóczi intended to confront the Hungarian counties, which were preparing to resist him, as Transylvania's crowned prince. Moreover, in order to secure the long-anticipated FrancoHungarian alliance, which was an essential condition for being in included in a general European peace treaty, the Hungarian Confederation had to effect an open and definitive break with the Habsburg empire, and settle the country's constitutional status. There was yet another reason for action: the imperial government had dispatched an army to reoccupy Transylvania, and the principality's diet, meeting at Medgyes on 10 January 1707, seemed unable to rally the country and mount an adequate defence.
In decrees issued on 15 February 1707, Rákóczi summoned the Transylvanian diet to convene in March, at Marosvásárhely, for his investiture, and delegated Ádám Vay to prepare the ground for his reforms. Due to pressing diplomatic business, Rákóczi himself could not set off for principality until mid-March.
{2-422.} In the meantime, the military situation in Transylvania deteriorated. The commander-in-chief, Lőrinc Pekry, failed to prevent Colonel Tige's 3,000-strong army from advancing into Transylvania; the Austrians consolidated their hold on Szeben and broke the Kuruc siege of Kolozsvár. As Tige's forces were pulling back from Kolozsvár toward Szeben, Tamás Esze's regiment of hajdús launched a surprise attack on them at Székelykocsárd. Pekry and his cavalry failed to intervene in this bloody encounter, and an opportunity to annihilate the emperor's army in Transylvania was lost.
Two other circumstances carried heavier consequences. The ill-supplied, and therefore undisciplined army had to live off the land. Officers requisitioned wine, grain, and fodder, forced villeins to transport these goods, and sold the goods for their personal profit; ordinary soldiers followed suit. Pekry himself sold grain at a high price to his own troops. Meanwhile, landowners took forceful measures to retrieve their villeins from the army.
The diet's session at Marosvásárhely began, on 5 April 1707, with the investiture of the prince. The military commander, Lőrinc Pekry, delivered greetings on behalf of the feudal estates. In an address prior to the formal investiture, Rákóczi spoke of the historic roots of princely authority and went on to outline how he wished to 'govern his country and protect the poor, widows and orphans'.[135] Judging from contemporary summaries, he mentioned neither the legacy of his ancestors nor the electoral function of the estates. Scholars have noted that the prothonotary András Bartha's welcoming speech bore the spirit of the early Enlightenment: 'Let there be constant light [...] let science, wisdom, and knowledge grow [...] let no one in this land live as a useless and mindless parasite [...] a truly happy country is one where people live by their labours and not by the sweat of others.'[136]
After hearing a Te Deum in the Jesuit church, Rákóczi proceeded to the Calvinist church for the formal opening of the diet. {2-423.} As prince, he was called to transcend the particular interests of the feudal estates, but the latter sought confirmation of the nobility's privileges. They requested that the prince restore all their rights and privileges, transfer treasury estates to deserving patriots, and govern in accordance with the will and advice of a council chosen by the estates. The nobles insisted that conscripted villeins be sent home; that troops be disciplined and the damage compensated; that there be freedom and security for commerce and a sound currency; and that a common system of measure be introduced.
In a report drafted by Pál Ráday, the prince emphasized the necessity of reforms: 'Our country's political, economic, and military affairs must be put in order so that subjects from all estates may enjoy the security they yearn for; we must be firm, stout-hearted, and single-minded in pursuit of our nation's common cause, so that we can celebrate the return of lasting calm and peace.' Since the Habsburg monarch only promised an amnesty and refused even to discuss terms for safeguarding the principality's independence, said Rákóczi, the war effort must be sustained; but in such a way that it does not lead to the 'ultimate ruin and unbearable subjection of tillers of the soil' and other inhabitants. It was therefore necessary to free commerce, generate higher revenues, and establish a standing army 'adequate for operations against the present enemy and prepared to defend the country in the future'.[137]
The prince, whose encampment was ringed by military units attached to his court, was largely successful in imposing his will. The bulk of his army was committed to the siege of Szeben, and Rabutin was nearing Transylvania with a sizeable imperial force. The Marquis des Alleurs had conveyed, in public, greetings from Louis XIV; this, along with displays of support by Rákóczi's Transylvanian followers, the towns, Saxons, and Székely soldiers, served to lend weight to his authority. The diet reiterated that Transylvania was severing its link with the House of Habsburg and acknowledged Prince Ferenc Rákóczi as its ruler. The latter was {2-424.} granted full powers to conduct foreign relations and to manage the country's revenues and resources. The diet also passed into law the agreement, approved by the Hungarian estates at Huszt, on a confederation of Transylvania and Hungary.
Rákóczi issued instructions for an expansion of the Treasury's sources of revenue, for an audit of state accounts, and for the promotion of commerce. He was evidently looking to the long term, for he ordered that the mint at Kolozsvár be reorganized. He granted Debrecen, which was under Transylvanian jurisdiction at the time, the status of a free royal borough, and several towns were exempted from taxes. Rákóczi also took steps aiming at a more equitable distribution of the tax burden, and at the more orderly recruitment and provisioning of troops. Although he adamantly rejected the demands of landowners that villeins be freed from military service, he failed to eliminate illegal practices in this respect. He confirmed and elaborated an earlier ruling, in which he had relieved villein soldiers of feudal services; such soldiers would be free from all feudal obligations as well as public ones, such as quartering troops and providing transport. To pay ransom, István Apor had driven the Székely people of Csík into villeinage; Rákóczi had a law passed restoring their freedom.
In Transylvania, as in other parts of Europe, official policy with regard to villeins was inspired by the need for military manpower and the wish to generate revenues independently from the feudal estates. The resulting measures were supposed to protect the peasantry, which paid taxes and supplied soldiers, from the arbitrariness of landowners and army officers; but, like elsewhere, the policy proved difficult to convert into practice. Rákóczi appointed Tamás Esze, a distinguished captain of villein background, to serve as brigadier in charge of three infantry regiments. Act XV of the diet laid the bases for a standing army, and, as a first step, Rákóczi officiated in Kolozsvár at the founding ceremony of the Society of Noble Youths; this institution, headed by Simon Kemény, was {2-425.} designed to nurture political leaders and officers for the Hungarian standing army.
A proposal for the reestablishment of a Catholic bishopric in Transylvania failed to pass. The diet confirmed the status of four recognized denominations, thus failing to acknowledge Transylvania's Greek Orthodox episcopacy or to address the urgent social needs of the large number of Romanian priests. Confusion surrounded the status of the bishop. Atanasie Anghel had 'openly de-nounced the union', and, even prior to Rákóczi's war of independence, the Hungarian Calvinists had backed a rival bishop, Ion Ţişca. Rákóczi expected Wallachia's ruler, Brîncoveanu, to name a distinguished church elder to the rank of bishop; the voivode did send greetings to the prince's investiture, but, apparently, his help did not suffice to obtain the appointment of a Greek Orthodox bishop.
Having familiarized himself with Transylvania's circumstances, Rákóczi could conclude that the country only needed a good prince. For their part, the delegates to the Marosvásárhely diet hoped to have found in Rákóczi a ruler who would insure the country's domestic tranquillity and peaceful progress: 'Your Highness, we recognize and acknowledge you as our good father, pro Patre Patriae.'[138]
During the diet, and over the busy days that followed, Rákóczi assembled a government; following past practice, it consisted of members the prince's inner circle. The feudal estates and the three 'nations' preserved their partial autonomy, but lord lieutenants and royal chief magistrates were appointed by Rákóczi. The Transylvanian aristocrat István Thoroczkai was named chairman of the princely council, which included among its members Ádám Vay, a senator from the Hungarian confederation. Other appointments included that of Bercsényi as Transylvania's governor, Pál Ráday as chancellor, András Bartha and Péter Samarjai as prothonotaries, and Ábrahám Barcsai as treasurer. In practice, the prince exercised {2-426.} direct control over fiscal matters, as well as over the Érc Mountains' mines, which were of crucial importance to the Transylvanian economy. In the recent past, many factors had impeded consolidation of an effective and up-to-date system of governance: frequent changes in the sovereign power, constantly shifting battle-lines, political divisions within the ruling elite, and attrition of the already small number of experienced civil servants issuing from the middle strata. Rákóczi would lack the time to remedy this situation.
After the conclusion of the diet, the prince planned to go to Brassó. He hoped that the Transylvanian army could capture that town, one of the most prosperous in the principality, before confronting the invading forces of General Rabutin. However, upon learning that the Hungarian counties were conspiring against him, Rákóczi hurriedly departed from Transylvania.
Confederation with the Hungarian Kingdom | 5. THE PRINCIPALITY OF FERENC RÁKÓCZI II | The Gubernium and Habsburg Military Rule |