| János Kemény | 1. THE PRESERVATION OF STATEHOOD | The Grand Vizier's Initiative |
It was an order backed by force of arms that propelled the young Apafi from his aristocratic family's manor at Ebesfalva to the throne of Transylvania. By nature, he was more disposed to contemplate than to rule. The well-educated Apafi participated in the political task of drafting János Kemény's terms for negotiation, but his interests lay more in the realm of philosophy and technology. His true pleasures lay in reading and the study of clocks. He had virtually no social basis at the time of his election, and the few noblemen who offered fealty did so only because they felt the closeness of the Turkish sabres. Most of the noble elite kept its distance; the Székelys were preparing to resist him; and the Saxons prudently chose to wait and see. His realm consisted of small enclaves scattered among the strongholds of Turkish and imperial troops who numbered in the thousands. His attempts to consolidate a power base were hindered by the Turkish and Habsburg emperors as well as by competitors for the princely throne.
It was thus in exceptionally difficult circumstances that Apafi explored the limited possibilities for an independent policy. He had to reckon with two realities. First, the Transylvanian state had been so weakened by the protracted political crisis that it was little more than a pawn in the contest between Turks and Habsburgs. Second, as he recognized, 'the survival or disappearance of Transylvania' was linked to the future of the Hungarian Kingdom.[9] He was fully aware that his rule extended over only part of Transylvania, but he intended to exploit the country's 'peculiar situation ... between two {2-244.} powerful nations' to serve its best interests.[10] Apafi had no illusions. He had spent close to two years in Tartar captivity, and he had observed how János Kemény's faith in the promises of the emperor and the palatine led to tragedy. He laboured patiently to build a power base, pacifying the Székelys and winning over the Saxons, but realized that the policy options were no longer alignment with the Habsburgs or with the Turks. He and his growing band of supporters now faced an even more fateful choice: to try to preserve, or to surrender Transylvania's statehood.
After promising fealty to the sultan, he promptly dispatched an envoy to the Habsburg court and sent out feelers to Hungary's political leaders. As early as 2 December 1661, he wrote to the staunchly pro-Habsburg István Csáky: 'Rest assured that we are not the least of your well-wishers; make use of our services, for we are ready to do whatever is in our power to please Your Excellency'.[11] Since the monarchy's leading figures had regarded János Kemény as the embodiment of a resolute and purposeful policy, and Apafi tried to win over the large and powerful group of Kemény supporters. To this end, he resorted to all possible positive and negative inducements, such as grants of property, cousinly persuasion, and confiscation. Those who, after the Battle of Nagyszőllős, rallied to his side were rewarded with high office: János Bethlen became chancellor, and Gábor Haller first councillor. But the Apafi government faced great domestic difficulties. Upon receiving confirmation of János Kemény's death, Emperor Leopold sent a letter of condolence to the widow and dispatched the bishop of Vác, Ferenc Szentgyörgyi, to Transylvania. The bishop's main mission was to get a new prince elected by Kemény's supporters. The latter, who included Dénes Bánffy, Gáspár Kornis, Gergely Bethlen, Boldizsár Macskási, János Szentpáli, and Mihály Teleki, were given to understand that 'His Majesty will not suffer Apafi or any other ruler appointed by the Turks, and he wants to continue protecting this country'. At a meeting in Aranyosmedgyes, they elected Simon {2-245.} Kemény as their leader and commissioned envoys to ask for the emperor's help.[12]
Around the time that Vienna learned of the defeat at Nagyszőllős, another piece of news arrived from the ambassador in Constantinople: the grand vizier, Mehmed Köprülü, had died at the end of 1661, and a struggle for the succession was under way. The court of Vienna considered that this development invalidated the Habsburg–Turkish agreement, and that Emperor Leopold could exploit the turmoil in the Ottoman leadership to reannex Transylvania to the Hungarian Kingdom, and thus to his empire. Porcia believed that the moment was ripe for settling, at little cost, the dynasty's relations with the kingdom, Transylvania included. On 13 February 1662, Leopold issued a proclamation: stressing the dangers of the situation in Transylvania, he insisted that a large armed force be stationed in Upper Hungary. Six thousand troops were dispatched to reinforce the garrisons in Transylvania, with orders to hold out to the last man. Montecuccoli was given unlimited military powers in Hungary. Kászoni conveyed a promise of substantial military assistance to the Kemény party. Finally, the Hungarian diet was convoked so that it could turn imperial policy into law. To persuade the reluctant palatine and the Hungarian feudal orders of the necessity of that last step, Vienna claimed that the emperor wished to meet his 'loyal Hungarians' because he intended to wage war against the Turks on behalf of Transylvania and therefore needed the diet's approval for taxes and supplies. The covert objective was to have the diet confirm by law what János Kemény had committed himself to, placing Transylvania under the suzerainty of the king of Hungary, i.e. the Habsburg emperor. Concurrently, Vienna's resident envoy at the Porte was instructed to negotiate an understanding with the new grand vizier, Ahmed Köprülü.
Paradoxically, the Habsburgs' Transylvanian policy turned out to be of use to Apafi. The astute, young grand vizier quickly took stock of the situation and concluded that Apafi needed stronger {2-246.} support. The prince's authority was confirmed both in a letter from the grand vizier and in a firman, dated 2 March 1662, from the sultan; Apafi was given a free hand in domestic affairs, and the tribute was reduced. Meanwhile, Ali, the pasha of Temesvár, and the new pasha of Várad, Mehmed Küchük, were instructed to seize the Habsburg-held fortresses in Transylvania; the imperial garrisons surrendered Görgény, then Fogaras. To be sure, Turkish support came at a price; in late April, Apafi and eight thousand of his troops had to join Mehmed Küchük for the siege Kolozsvár.
By then, Apafi's government had learned how to exploit conflicts of interest between the two great powers. Gábor Haller, Apafi's ambassador at the Porte, informed his younger brother János, who was serving as the prince's treasurer, that if the Turks managed to capture the fortresses by force, the sultan would consider them his own; whereas if Emperor Leopold was prepared to withdraw the garrisons, he could set certain conditions.
János Haller travelled to Hungary, ostensibly on family business, but actually to deliver messages from Apafi. The latter wrote to István Csáky: 'We wanted to inform Your Excellency, who is a true Hungarian, that the same thing will happen to Kolozsvár as happened to Várad.'[13] In a message to Nádasdy, Apafi asked the lord chief justice to 'have confidence in our poor motherland, Transylvania'.[14] Also, it was probably Haller who conveyed Apafi's requests to the palatine; and it was presumably from the latter that Porcia learned of the sultan's letter of endorsement for the prince. Meanwhile, members of the Transylvanian estates, encamped near Kolozsvár, addressed an open letter to Palatine Wesselényi. They requested that he persuade the emperor to withdraw the garrisons from Transylvania: 'If the mighty Turks lay siege to [the fortresses], the Christians will never get these back; as a consequence, our country will perish, and, within a few months, so will Hungary.' Pasha Ali was already on his way to take Kolozsvár 'with the same force that he had applied at Várad'. The nobles stressed that 'having {2-247.} given clear and true warning, we cannot be held responsible for the intensified threat to Christendom if we are to perish; not we, but those who allowed this to happen, will be accountable before the Christian world, for, by sacrificing us, they will have endangered all Christendom'.[15]
The Kemény party delegated Mihály Teleki to convey an alternative proposal to Emperor Leopold when the Hungarian diet convened at Pozsony in May 1662. They asked the monarch to either provide the military assistance necessary to drive the Turks from Transylvania, or, if he preferred to make peace with the Porte, to obtain that they, the supporters of the late János Kemény, be returned to power. The palatine and other Hungarian politicians also urged the Habsburg court to make a choice: to negotiate a peace and obtain the return of Várad in exchange for the withdrawal of garrisons, or to commit all necessary resources for a successful war against the Turks.
Porcia and his supporters had often referred to János Kemény as a 'second Martinuzzi' because of his skill in creating a common front with Hungary's politicians. They regarded the Transylvanian and Hungarian politicians' joint initiative on the Turkish question to be all the more dangerous insofar as it drew the attention of other European powers. The emperor, who was scheduled to move on from Pozsony to a meeting at Regensburg of the German princes, feared that the latter would desert him and thus undermine his prestige. To influence opinion abroad, Montecuccoli was commissioned to draft a pamphlet explaining both the failure of the 1661 campaign and the Habsburg court's Transylvanian policy.
The pamphlet, which was written in Latin and also distributed to the delegates at the Pozsony diet, claimed that the military expedition of 1661 could be considered successful: it had brought Prince János Kemény back to Transylvania and provided effective assistance by entrenching an imperial military presence in the principality. At that point, Montecuccoli changed tack. Acknowledging that {2-248.} his forces had neither recovered Transylvania nor confronted the Turks in battle, the commander-in-chief deflected responsibility on János Kemény. When the Turks confronted the latter, his army was in disarray, his military tactics were unprofessional, and his conduct of the battle was disastrous. The Transylvanian nobles had rebelled against the emperor; they were militarily inept and useless for an anti-Turkish campaign. In concluding this litany of reproaches directed at the Hungarians, Montecuccoli reported that in Hungary, too, the emperor's German troops had met with hostility, to the point of being driven to 'martyrdom'. The pamphlet no doubt contained some partial truths, but it was suffused by a political tendentiousness that robbed it of credibility. Kemény's followers, who had been the only supporters of the emperor's Transylvanian policy, were deeply offended by Montecuccoli's tirade. Yet the pamphlet served as an excuse for Hungary's politicians to air their views on Transylvania.
'Most excellent leader!' The opening words of Miklós Zrínyi's soon-to-be famous pamphlet gave the impression that his riposte was aimed at no one but Montecuccoli: 'So you compelled 50,000 Turks to pull back by 50 miles? You put Prince Kemény back on the throne? You stationed new garrisons in the fortresses? You saved Transylvania? Well, well! These are great, indeed the greatest of deeds! But your glory begins and ends with these fine words. Tell me, how did Hungary benefit from your military expedition? Tell me, have you given us back Transylvania, which was in good shape when you seized it? First, restore to Transylvania Prince Kemény, who had your word and your promises of protection, and restore the happiness, peace, and plenty that you and your armies banished from the land; and then you may have your victory parade.'[16] Zrínyi was obviously exaggerating, for since 1567 Transylvania had enjoyed little happiness, peace, or plenty. Yet this only confirms that he was using Montecuccoli as an excuse to denounce the emperor's policy on Transylvania. He spoke of events {2-249.} in Transylvania, but his target was Vienna's relationship with Constantinople. 'Please do not digress and dwell on the errors committed in the war by Rákóczi and Kemény. They have paid for their mistakes. By shedding their blood, and indeed by sacrificing their lives, they gave shining proof of their heartfelt patriotism and Christian zeal. You, on the other hand, have provided a splendid display of cold indifference; your Christian compassion can no more be aroused than calves can fly.' Without trying to exonerate Rákóczi, Zrínyi struck at the heart of the matter: 'If the prince — reckless though he was — had received appropriate aid, the cause of Hungary, indeed of Christendom, would not be in such great jeopardy; Várad, the final resting place of many saintly kings and a jewel in our crown, would not groan under the Turkish yoke, and the ashes of our saintly kings would not lie in disgraceful servitude.'[17] Zrínyi concluded that Transylvania's problems could be resolved only in the context of a broad, international effort directed against the Turks.
From this point on, the Hungarian politicians who promoted the formation of a great anti-Turkish coalition would increasingly count on Apafi's collaboration. The prince would regularly inform Wesselényi about developments, and it is thanks to the palatine's mediation that Apafi reached an understanding with the Kemény party. At the 1662 diet, that party's members, like the other Hungarians, concluded that Porcia was simply leading them on, and, before the year was out, several of them had rallied to Apafi. The captain of the crucially important fortress of Kővár, Mihály Teleki, followed suit in the summer of 1663. On 5 September 1663, Dénes Bánffy wrote to Teleki that Prince Apafi was the best guarantee that 'Transylvania would stand by Christendom'.[18]
| János Kemény | 1. THE PRESERVATION OF STATEHOOD | The Grand Vizier's Initiative |