{2-250.} The Grand Vizier's Initiative

After failing to secure Transylvania for the emperor, the Porcia government took unfavourable note of the emerging collaboration between Hungarian and Transylvanian politicians and redoubled its efforts to obtain from the grand vizier a confirmation of peaceful relations. It soon became evident that Ahmed Köprülü was both a consummate diplomat and a far-seeing strategist.

The grand vizier set tough preconditions to negotiation: the emperor must definitively give up Várad and promise not to support a claim to the Transylvanian throne by any descendant of Rákóczi or Kemény. The Privy Council authorized Goess, the imperial commissioner, to accept these terms, but hardly had he signed the document in Temesvár before it came to light that the Porte was making preparations for another campaign of conquest.

The domestic turmoil that accompanied the choice of a new grand vizier was swiftly quelled by Ahmed Köprülü, who proceeded to follow in his father's footsteps. Still in his twenties, and full of energy, he moved purposefully and applied the latest techniques to secure his ends. He, too, wanted to keep Transylvania calm and peaceful, at least until he had succeeded in recovering Candia (Iraklion) and the rest of Crete. He was well informed about Apafi and his government; it was probably the interpreter Panajot, in close touch with the imperial envoys, who briefed him on the links between the Hungarian and Transylvanian politicians, and on the prince's communications with Vienna. And if the grand vizier took into account that the new voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia, Gheorghe Ghica and Mihnea (the third voivode to bear this name), were plotting against the Porte, Transylvania must have seemed that much less secure. Finally, he had to face a growing threat from Europe, which was evidently preparing to challenge Ottoman power.

{2-251.} The grand vizier understood that the best way to deal with these dangers was to strike first. The conquest of royal Hungary would put him at Vienna's gates and secure Transylvania. He would exploit the rapprochement between Hungarian politicians and Apafi, and make Transylvania serve his strategy. If Apafi proved uncooperative, he would be replaced; according to Panajot, the grand vizier kept Gábor Haller close to hand in case he needed to appoint a new prince. The political disharmony between Habsburgs and Hungarians had become so obvious that even a statesman of lesser calibre than Ahmed Köprülü would have felt impelled to exploit it.

As early as December 1662, the captain of Putnok, Fábián Farkas, informed Wesselényi that the Turks were rallying support for an attack on the 'Germans': 'In Szatmár, Ung, and other counties, the drums are heard, flags are raised, and captains and lieutenants have been appointed [...] they are siding with Apafi and the Turks'.[19]19. Fábián Farkas to Wesselényi, Putnok, 19 December 1662. OL, Nlt, A. V, Fasc. 13. A month later, István Vitnyédi claimed that 'Pasha Ali had occupied all of Transylvania and turned it into a province of the Ottoman empire'.[20]20. István Vitnyédi to Jónás Mednyánszky, Vienna, 23 January 1663. HHStA, Hungarica Specialia, Fasc. 309. The truth behind this rumour was that the pasha — who had been honoured with the title 'Favourite of the Prophet' for his capture of Várad — had orders to bring the siege of Kolozsvár to a successful conclusion, seize the other fortresses from their imperial garrisons, and deliver a message from the grand vizier to Apafi. 'You and your countrymen should hold yourselves in readiness,' wrote Köprülü, 'for the mighty sultan swears he will not lay down his glittering weapons [until he obtains a country for you]. He sees that you are poor, so grieve not for Várad, because very soon he will compensate you with provinces and a country.'[21]21. Palatine Ferenc Wesselényi to János Rottal, Németlipcse, 13 February 1663. OL, Nlt, A. V, Fasc. 13. By the time the grand vizier and his troops set off from Hadrianopolis, it was common knowledge that he planned to convoke a diet at Pozsony and put Apafi on the Hungarian throne. From Belgrade, the grand vizier dispatched a new proposal to the emperor, but the terms were obviously unacceptable. Without waiting {2-252.} for an answer, he marched on Buda, taking along, in comfortable captivity, Gábor Haller as well as the emperor's ambassador and other envoys.

For several months, Apafi put off complying with the grand vizier's instruction that he go to Hungary. For one thing, he had never aspired to be king of Hungary. For another, he had ample experience of the constraints facing a ruler under Turkish suzerainty: an annual tribute of 40,000 gold pieces (160,000 forints), demands for heavy war reparations, and the obligation to raise troops and go to war. Having committed himself to royal Hungary's politicians, he kept the palatine briefed about the grand vizier's plans. Apafi was aware that the emerging international coalition against the Turks counted on Transylvania and, indirectly, on the Romanian principalities. He therefore exploited every possible pretext to avoid leaving Transylvania. The voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia marched across Transylvania dutifully and in good order, but Apafi advised the grand vizier that he could not afford to leave his country undefended.

Finally, Ahmed Köprülü, who was encamped near Érsekújvár, sent a pasha to fetch Apafi: 'The people of Hungary want to pay homage to you [...] come and assume the high honor granted to you by the heavens, for when the Hungarian estates learn of your presence, they will spontaneously welcome you as their ruler. You will promise them the Turks' assistance and respect for their liberties [...] there is no need to bring your troops [...] only your personal presence is necessary.'[22]22. L. Szalay, Magyarország története V (Pest, 1859), p. 81. The diet was convened at Radnót to rule on the proposed trip of the prince. Some councillors feared for the country, others that the prince was heading for 'slaughter'. On the other hand, it was obvious that if the invitation was declined, the grand vizier would punish the country by unleashing the troops of the pasha of Várad; then Transylvania would have to elect a prince, and yet another struggle for power would ensue. In the end, Apafi left a triumvirate, consisting of István Petki, Pál Béldi, and András {2-253.} Fleischer, in charge of the country and departed from Radnót on 20 September. Travelling by way of Lippa, Arad, and Buda, he reached Köprülü's camp near Érsekújvár on October 18.

The grand vizier treated him like a head of state. Ostensibly of his own 'free will', the Transylvanian prince entered the fortress of Buda and spent one day in the palace once occupied by King Matthias Corvinus. At the camp near Érsekújvár, he stayed in a tent richly decorated with gold and velvet; he received fabulous gifts and was honoured several times with a ceremonial caftan. After two days of meetings, 'the prince, at the grand vizier's orders, sent off a manifesto to the towns and counties'.[23]23. I. Czeglédi, Tekintetes Apafi Mihály erdélyi fejedelemnek a török nemzet közé való menetele édes hazájáért (Kolozsvár, 1670).

The manifesto, backdated to October 18, bore the signature of Apafi. It promised personal freedom and security of property to all Hungarians who submitted to the Turkish sultan. There is no doubt that Ahmed Köprülü's timing was superb. The dissemination of the manifesto bearing the news that royal Hungary and Transylvania would be under one king coincided with the occupation of Érsekújvár by the Turks. As the palatine's inquiry later revealed, plans were even drawn up for the ceremony of allegiance. Despite all this, Köprülü's scheme did not bear fruit.

Hungarian politicians prepared to resist the grand vizier. They lacked the military power to save Érsekújvár, but they refused to pay homage. In a national proclamation, Wesselényi tried to paint a realistic picture, particularly with respect to Transylvania and its alleged security: 'Have we not seen seven different Transylvanian princes in the time it takes to wear out two pairs of good red riding boots?' Only death saved György Rákóczi I from the Turks' revenge; György Rákóczi II was fatally wounded by an Ottoman sword. The Turks put Rhédey and Barcsai on the princely throne, then left them in the lurch. The 'fondly remembered Prince Kemény' was succeeded by the 'caftaned' Apafi, and who knows when he will be shunted aside in favour of yet another prince. As for the alleged benefits of alignment with the Turks, Transylvania's {2-254.} record speaks for itself. 'What happened to the free election of princes after Gabriel Bethlen's death? By how much was the tribute raised? Sooner or later, Transylvania will meet the same fate as Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bulgaria. Will Mihály Apafi attest that he has led a carefree life in Transylvania? You say you feel sorry for us, Prince Apafi? Weep instead for yourself and your children.' After relating at length the dire consequences of Turkish occupation and the Porte's conflicts with the Persians, the palatine called the country to arms. Wesselényi concluded with a challenge: 'Let the lord Mihály Apafi, who styles himself prince of Transylvania, change the order of things [and] rid Transylvania of the ills from which he wants to preserve Hungary, ... and if he is a true prince, His Highness should not serve as the Turkish nation's conquering clerk.'[24]24. Szalay, Magyarország története V, pp. 81-2. He thus revealed to the public that the manifesto calling for submission did not represent the true wishes of Transylvania's prince. The palatine's proclamation also underscored that the Hungarians had no wish to follow Transylvania's lead in accepting Turkish suzerainty, and that they wanted Transylvania itself to assume new responsibilities. The sharp-eyed Dávid Rozsnyai, who served the Turks as a clerk, noted that Apafi committed many mistakes while at the camp of the grand vizier. He behaved in a way unworthy of a prince of Transylvania. Worn down by illness, Apafi complained of exhaustion and kept calling for doctors. Ahmed Köprülü's disappointment grew as he observed the young prince; he realized that he had erred in inviting a man he did not know how to be king. The more mature Gábor Haller had equally distinguished origins and a broad European culture; but Köprülü did not want to justify the palatine's public charge that the Turks replaced Transylvania's princes at will. Back at the Porte, Köprülü's opponents were only emboldened by the evident failure of his strategy. The angry grand vizier needed a scapegoat, and the links between Hungary's and Transylvania's politicians gave him a ready excuse to blame Haller, who was summarily beheaded.